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THE FOURTH ANNUAL A.A. SOMMER, JR.
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FINANCIAL LAW*
SPEAKER:
William J. McDonough **
Chairman, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
DEAN'S WELCOME
DEAN TREANOR': Good evening. I am Bill Treanor, the Dean of
Fordham Law School, and I would like to welcome you all tonight to the
Fourth Annual A.A. Sommer Lecture.
This lecture series started in 2000. We began with Arthur Levitt,
then had lectures from Mary Shapiro and, last year, SEC Commissioner
Harvey Goldschmid. The lecture series -has grown in conjunction with
our Center for Corporate Securities & Financial Law, directed by
Professor Jill Fisch with the assistance of Professor Caroline Gentile.
I am delighted to introduce tonight William McDonough, our
Fourth Annual Sommer lecturer, who is Chairman of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB" or "Board").
I would like to recognize Professor Fisch, Professor Gentile, and
Florencia Marotta, our Corporate Center Fellow, for all their work in
The lecture herein was held at the Fordham University School of Law on November
11, 2003, for the fourth annual A. A. Sommer, Jr., Lecture on Corporate, Securities &
Financial Law. It has been edited with the assistance of the speaker.
William J. McDonough served as the eighth president and chief executive officer of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for ten years, from July 19, 1993 to June 10,
2003. On June 11, 2003, he became the first Chairman of the newly created Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).
1. William Michael Treanor is the Dean of the Fordham University School of
Law.
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putting together this evening's lecture. I would like to also recognize
John Peloso of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, which was Mr. Sommer's
firm. Mr. Peloso has been so instrumental in the creation of this lecture
series and in the creation of our Corporate Law Center, which is rapidly
remerging as one of the nation's leading think tanks in the area.
I now turn matters over to Mr. Peloso. Thank you very much.
WELCOME
MR. PELOSO 2: Good evening, everybody.
I am here simply for the lecture, but I am also at the podium on
behalf of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius to welcome you and Mr.
McDonough to the Fourth Annual A.A. Sommer Lecture on Securities
Law.
As I think many of you out there know, this lecture was established
four years ago by Morgan Lewis as a way of interacting with Fordham
Law School to stimulate the study of securities law and as a way of
helping to get started a Center for Corporate Securities Law here at
Fordham, which has been done, as you just heard the Dean say.
We thought a good way to do that was to have a lecture in honor of
our partner who is the one most identified with the securities world, Al
Sommer. Al was a Partner of Morgan Lewis for many years before
retiring in 1994. He was a practicing corporate lawyer all of his career,
with some time out to be a very distinguished member of the U.S.
Securities & Exchange Commission and on the adjunct faculty of a
number of law schools. He was very, very active in professional
affairs-the list would be too long to go through. Some of it is in your
program.
He was especially connected to the accounting industry from which
he received in 2000 their Gold Medal of Honor Award for years of
service to the accounting industry, making Mr. McDonough's presence
here this evening particularly appropriate, for which we thank you.
Al was here for the first two lectures to introduce the speaker, but
right before last year's lecture he passed away. I know his lovely wife
Starr was going to be here, and she may be stuck in traffic. In any event,
2. John F.X. Peloso is Senior Counsel to the law firm of Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius, L.P., in New York, New York.
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I like to think that Al will always be with us with these lectures because
it really stands as a monument to his professional career.
Morgan Lewis is very proud of its affiliation with Al through the
years. He was the founder of our securities practice and somebody from
whom many of us learned a lot. We are really pleased to have
sponsored this lecture in his honor.
Welcome, everybody.
INTRODUCTION
PROFESSOR FISCH3 : Good evening. On behalf of the Fordham
Law School community, I am delighted to welcome you, and add my
welcome, to the Fourth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr., Lecture.
I would like to express the School's deep gratitude to the firm of
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius for their generosity in establishing the
lecture.
Because we are commemorating the seventieth anniversary of the
Securities and Exchange Commission in 2004, we have the honor of
having the SEC Historical Society join us as well.
I would also like to express our gratitude to PCAOB Chairman
William McDonough for agreeing to deliver this year's lecture.
As you know, the Sommer Lecture is one of the crown jewels of
Fordham's recently established Center for Corporate Securities &
Financial Law. Somehow we have had the good fortune and foresight
during the Lecture's short history of identifying speakers who are able to
offer us early insights into some of the most significant events affecting
the business community.
This year's speaker is, of course, no exception. It is, as John Peloso
mentioned, particularly appropriate to welcome Mr. McDonough
tonight, both because of the prominence and importance of the PCAOB
and because Al Sommer was known as a strong proponent of increased
auditing and accounting disclosures.
As with previous lectures, tonight's lecture will be published in
Fordham's specialized business journal, the Fordham Journal of
Corporate & Financial Law.
3. Jill E. Fisch is a Professor at the Fordham University School of Law and is the
Director of its Center for Corporate, Securities & Financial Law.
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More generally, we expect the Lecture and the entire Corporate
Center to continue to build on Fordham's strengths in business law.
These strengths include Fordham's strong faculty, including a number of
very distinguished adjunct faculty members; the Securities Arbitration
Clinic, in which students represent small investors who lose money
investing in the stock market; the School's remarkable alumni base,
which includes top leaders in the field of business law, many of whom
are here tonight; and the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial
Law.
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board was created by
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20024 to oversee the auditing of public
companies in order to protect the interests of investors and to improve
the quality of financial reporting. Established in response to revelations
of accounting fraud and earnings manipulation at numerous publicly
traded companies, the PCAOB is charged with, among other things,
establishing auditing standards and overseeing auditor independence.
The PCAOB is a private sector, nonprofit corporation. Its chairman
and members of the board are appointed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
Currently the PCAOB is in the process of revising the auditing
standard dealing with the auditors' review of an issuer's internal
controls, as well as beginning its process of inspecting accounting firms.
It gives me great pleasure to introduce Chairman William J.
McDonough. Mr. McDonough became Chairman of the PCAOB on
June 11, 2003, joining the Board after ten years as President and Chief
Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. At the
New York Fed, Mr. McDonough served as the Vice Chairman and a
permanent member of the Federal Open Market Committee, the group
responsible for formulating the nation's monetary policy. Mr.
McDonough also served as a member of the Board of Directors of the
Bank for International Settlements and Chairman of the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision.
Prior to joining the Federal Reserve Bank Mr. McDonough had
spent twenty-two years at First Chicago Corp. and its bank, First
National Bank of Chicago. Mr. McDonough also served with the U.S.
State Department from 1961-1967 and was a U.S. Navy officer from
4. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2003)
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).
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1956-1961. Mr. McDonough earned a master's degree in economics
from Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., in 1962, and a
bachelor's degree in economics from Holy Cross College in Worcester,
Massachusetts, in 1956.
Auditing standards and auditor independence are certainly a focus
of public attention today. Many have blamed gatekeepers such as
auditors for failing to detect and prevent the widespread corporate
misconduct of the past several years. Whether or not auditors can
properly be blamed for those frauds, improving the independence and
quality of the auditing process is clearly a key element in restoring
public trust in the national securities markets. Mr. McDonough and his
colleagues on the PCAOB certainly have their work cut out for them.
It is my pleasure to introduce William J. McDonough.
LECTURE
MR. McDONOUGH: Thank you.
I feel very much at home here. You can tell when you're in a Jesuit
University when the sign of the University includes Latin. I received an
honorary doctorate degree a couple of years ago from Holy Cross, and
of course the whole thing is in Latin. I think that I have met three
people who have looked at it and actually understand what it says.
I am particularly happy to be here today, but I am proud and
humbled to be delivering a lecture honoring A.A. Sommer, Jr. I did not,
in fact, have the good fortune to know Commissioner Sommer before he
passed away last year, but I have learned enough about him to know that
both investors and those of us charged with overseeing participants in
our markets lost a great friend. The abuses that we have seen in our
markets make the loss of a single voice of integrity all the more painful.
Few of us could have imagined three years ago that we would be
where we are today, in a world in which accounting, auditing, and
corporate governance would be subject to a strict new regime under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.5 Remember, just three years ago Enron was held
up as a paragon of corporate success, modem and cutting edge, from its
management structure to its grip on the world of energy contracts.
Now, you in this room need little reminder, but I think it behooves
all of us to remember from whence we have come. The American
5. Id.
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private sector has long been the envy of the world. Despite its faults-
and there are many-our version of capitalism certainly beat anything
that any state-supported economy had to offer for creating wealth and
distributing it reasonably well.
Then, what happened in the 1990s to change this American private-
sector economy model for the world to one in which our own American
people have lost considerable confidence?
The economic expansion, which began in 1991, was quite slow in
its early years, but began to accelerate in late 1993. The Federal
Reserve began to tighten monetary policy in early 1994 and actually
doubled the official interest rate over a twelve-month period. We at the
Fed did that because the economy was beginning to speed its way
through two limits on which virtually all macroeconomists had agreed as
the policy guidance tools of the post-World War II American economy.
One was the rate at which the economy could grow without putting
such strain on resources that inflation would follow. That speed limit, as
I call it, is the sum of two parts: growth in the labor force and output per
work hour, called labor force productivity. The labor force grows pretty
steadily, at about 1 percent per year.6 From 1973-1995 labor force
productivity grew at an average of about 1.5 percent per year7 -ergo, the
speed limit was 2.5 percent (1 plus 1.5).
The other popular concept among economists was the NAIRU, the
Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment. The idea is that
below a certain level of unemployment the suppliers of labor demand
more wages and benefits than the economy can deliver without inflation.
Most, if not all, economists thought the NAIRU was 6 percent.8
But in 1995 the economy began accelerating at well above the
speed limit of 2.5 percent and unemployment was falling below 6
6. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Statistics, Working in the 21st Century, at
http://www.bls.gov/opub/working/pagelb.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2004).
7. See "Major Sector Productivity & Costs Index," Productivity & Technology, at
http://stats.bls.gov/data/home.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2004). This website is linked to
a database that is customizable for any time period between 1947 to 2003.
8. Philip Harvey, Combating Joblessness: An Analysis of the Principal Strategies
that Have Influenced the Development of American Employment and Social Welfare
Law During the 20th Century, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 677 (2000).
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percent. 9 Yet, not even paranoid central bankers could see inflation in
sight, so the Fed held back and allowed the phenomenon to take place.
And did it ever! Growth accelerated, we began to create 3 million
new jobs per year, and the unemployment rate fell below 5%-and still
no inflation.'0
Although it seemed a bit mysterious at first, we soon realized that
there had been a breakout in productivity improvement. In the latter
years of the 1990s, labor force productivity increased from the previous
1.5 percent to 2.5 percent, and has been rising since then." In the
second quarter of this year it was 7 percent, and in the third quarter it
was 8.6 percent.' 2 To the wonder of all economists, since the recession
began in early 2001 the average rate of labor force productivity
improvement has been 5 percent."' Why?
I believe that the real drive is globalization. Heads of business,
obviously in the case of makers of goods, but also in many areas for the
9. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Statistics, A-]: Employment Status of the
Civilian Noninstitutional Population 16 Years and Over, 1969 to Date (stating the
unemployment rate for 1995), at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/suppl/empsit.cpseeal.txt (last
visited Mar. 10, 2004).
10. Id. (indicating that the unemployment rate for 1997 to 2001 was below 5%).
11. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Statistics, 1993 Productivity and Costs -
Fourth Quarter and Annual Averages (Revised) (stating that the annual business sector
productivity rate increased 1.8% for 1993), at
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/news.release/History/prod2.030894.news (last visited Mar. 10,
2004); U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Statistics, 1998 Productivity and Cost - Fourth
Quarter and Annual Averages (Revised) (stating that the annual business sector
productivity rate increased 2.4% for 1998), at
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/news.release/History/prod2.030999.news (last visited Mar. 10,
2004).
12. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Statistics, 2003 Productivity and Costs -
Second Quarter (Revised) (stating that the annual business sector productivity rate
increased 7.2% for the second quarter), at
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/news.release/History/prod2.09042003.news (last visited Mar. 10,
2004) ; U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Statistics, 2003 Productivity and Costs - Third
Quarter (Revised) (stating that the annual business sector productivity rate increased
8.6%), at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/news.release/History/prod2.12032003.news (last visited
Mar. 10, 2004).
13. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Statistics, 2003 Productivity and Costs -
Fourth Quarter (Revised) (stating that the annual average increase in business sector
productivity was 4.5% for 2002-2003), at
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/news.release/History/prod2.03042004.news (last visited Mar. 10,
2004).
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sellers of services, are competing in a world market with China, India,
Mexico, and even Japan. It is impossible to raise prices.
Now, with no pricing power and a tight labor market requiring
rising salaries and benefits, the business executive can either finance the
increased labor cost through a reduction in profits, or he or she can
invest in an improvement in productivity to both finance the labor costs
and improve profitability. That latter choice is the one they made.
Some people thought we had a new world economic order and that
the business cycle was dead. This was not completely irrational, even if
wildly optimistic, because we did in fact have the longest expansion in
American history-ten years.
But this was not a new economy, even though there were some
ever-more-powerful information technology products. For the 93
percent of the American economy which produces neither IT hardware
nor software, a lot of the investment was in information technology to
reduce costs. Retailers are the most obvious example. When you check
out of a store, if it is a really modem one like Wal-Mart, the bar code
tells the clerk what to charge you, but it also updates the inventory
record and the order book for replacements.
The result is that the store, or chain of stores, does not need clerks
in the back room keeping inventory records, or warehouses to store the
inventories. We have copied the just-in-time manufacturing system of
the Japanese, and the goods arrive at the stores when they are needed. In
this model you can see the costs go down very extensively, which is why
Wal-Mart has been so enormously successful, and other companies
follow.
Now, this was very good running of a business in response to
international realities, but it was translated as something so
revolutionary that the leaders of the American business community
became confused. We saw confusion about the role of the CEO. We
saw the advent of the CEO superstar, and an explosion in compensation
that made those superstar CEOs actually believe that they were worth
more than 400 times the pay of their average workers. Twenty years
before, they had been paid an average of forty times the average worker,
so the multiple went from forty to 400- an increase of ten times in
twenty years. That was thoroughly unjustified by all economic
reasoning, and in addition, in my view, it is grotesquely immoral.
We saw mass confusion over the importance of earnings reports.
When the private sector pinned its success to a report, and not to actual
A.A. SOMMER LECTURE: McDONOUGH
earnings, the end was in sight. It became fashionable for public
companies to encourage allegedly independent investment analysts to
reach a consensus on the companies' quarterly and annual earnings, a
consensus which was closely guided of course by the financial
management of the company.
Then the market decided that the genius CEO was truly a genius if
the company beat the estimate, which the genius had of course
procreated. If he beat it by a penny or more, he was truly a genius. If he
missed it by a penny or more, he was a fool. That was the atmosphere.
Now, the genius CEO really doesn't have to tell everybody in his
company, or hers, to be corrupt. "You all know you all work for me. I
want to make $0.45 this quarter, and we're all going to do real well,
especially me, if we make $0.45 or more. So we'll make $0.45. You
will all cheat just a little to make sure that we do what we say we will
do. The next quarter we may have to cheat a little bit more and next
quarter maybe a little bit more still." Pretty soon, it's pure Alice in
Wonderland.
Now, the financial management of the company cannot do all these
creative things without the connivance and collusion of investment
bankers, commercial bankers, accountants, and even lawyers. Then the
end came, and what an end it was. The shock wave started with Enron,
the previous model, then rolled through Adelphia, WorldCom,
HealthSouth, and others.
The American people looked at the wreckage of our vaunted private
sector, and they got angry. They had been noticing that something had
been going wrong, as their 401(k) plans sank south after the market
broke in 2000, but they really got angry when the corporate scandals
came and the perpetrators used inside information to sell the stock when
the employees' 401(k) plans were frozen. The people got angry with the
CEOs, with the boards, and even with those of us in the regulatory
sector. In a democracy, when the people get angry, they will insist on
change.
Congress and the President responded. The result was the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.'4 You have only to look at the size of the
affirmative votes in Congress and the alacrity with which the President
signed the bill into law to know that the politicians heard the anger too.
14. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2003)
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
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Now, directors, CEOs, and accountants may be tempted to treat
Sarbanes-Oxley as a "to do" list, a list of "must do/mustn't do" items,
that can be tucked away once every item is checked.
But checking items and checking boxes won't cut it in this new
world. Why? Because the people are still angry. I know so from
meeting with many members of Congress who tell me that the mail from
their constituents is heavy, and it is hot. Americans are telling their
elected representatives that they are angry, and the thing they are
angriest about, by the way, is executive compensation.
I am here speaking to you as an individual, and my views do not
necessarily represent those of the board and the staff of the PCAOB.
But I believe it is important for all of us to consider the anger of the
American people and urge corrective action now.
Corporate directors should think long and hard about the
compensation of the executives who head the corporations that they, the
directors, are sworn to protect. In an ideal world, every CEO would go
to his or her board and ask the members to reexamine executive
compensation, starting with his or her own pay. What made sense two
or three years ago-or probably didn't make sense two or three years
ago-may certainly not make sense today.
If the CEO doesn't ask for a reexamination, I would urge board
members to undertake the reexamination themselves. If the pay should
be slightly reduced, what is the worst that can happen? An insulted
CEO resigns or takes early retirement. He or she has the burden of
finding new work or not dying of boredom in South Florida. Directors,
as fiduciaries of their corporations, will have the satisfaction of having
said to investors, to the public, and to the world, that "this is what the
job is worth," and you and I know all kinds of people who would just
love to be the CEO of that company at the new compensation package.
Now, I don't mean to oversimplify the upheaval that such a course
of action would entail, but we have to start somewhere, my friends, and
we have to start soon. Accountability, not just to investors but to the
public at large, is what we must be all about. We are going to have to
work at it, all of us, whether we are in the public sector or the private
sector.
Like most you, my new job is in the private sector. The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act established the PCAOB as a private-sector, nongovernmental
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body. 5 All five of us Board members are appointed by the Securities
and Exchange Commission, and all of our rules must be approved by the
SEC,16 but there the government ties end.
The PCAOB is not a government-sponsored, taxpayer-funded
enterprise. Our source of funding is the public companies that benefit
from independent audits. In early August, we sent invoices to almost
8,500 public companies and investment companies for their share of our
support. We are now approaching the time that we need to inform the
SEC which companies have paid and which have not. Those companies
that have not paid cannot get a clean opinion from their auditor-a
rather strong inducement to pay.
PCAOB takes its oversight duties from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
We exist to enforce accountability among auditors, but our
responsibilities offer guidance to anyone who participates in our capital
markets.
I want to say, first, that I approach my new job at the PCAOB as I
approached my job as the top bank supervisor at the New York Fed. I
expect that accountants, as members of a regulated profession, know
what the rules are. I expect that they are following those rules both in
their letter and in their spirit. I bring these expectations and the respect
they engender to the table when I deal with the firms as Chairman of the
PCAOB.
If they depart from those expectations-that is, if they break the
rules, or if they ignore the spirit of the law even while respecting the
letter-our dealings will be most unpleasant. There will be
consequences, and they will be grave.
The members of the accounting profession are going to have to
prove that they have earned the people's trust. They will have to work
not to get back to where they were before the corporate scandals-you
can never go backwards-but to a better place. They will do that by
living up to the letter and spirit of the law.
I had the opportunity to share those thoughts in September in my
first public speech as head of the PCAOB with the New York State
Society of CPAs. I did not receive a standing ovation after my speech,
but I wasn't chased out of the room by angry accountants either. I was
happy to later read a report that one of their members described my
15. Id. at § 101.
16. Id. at § 107.
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message as "tough love." I like that. One of my most important jobs as
Chairman of the PCAOB is setting the tone for our oversight of public
accounting firms, and "tough love" is a good start.
As a functioning entity, the PCAOB opened its doors on January
1st of this year. At that time there were four Board members and barely
as many staff. I joined the Board on June 11 th, exactly one day after I
left the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
The staff has now grown to a talented and dedicated band of almost
100 hardy souls, and we are continuing to grow. I would be remiss if I
did not make a bit of a recruiting pitch here. If you have friends who
you think might be right for our exciting work at the PCAOB, by all
means encourage them to apply.
We don't want zealots, but we don't want pussycats either. We are
looking for good, experienced accountants, and we are looking for the
right spirit too. We are also looking for some very good lawyers, but a
smaller number.
We want people who understand our mission: to oversee the
auditors of public companies in order to protect the interests of investors
and further the public interest in the preparation of informative, fair, and
independent audit reports. In other words, we are in business to hold
auditors accountable for their work.
We are going about that mission by fulfilling the four key tasks set
out for us in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: registration, inspection,
enforcement, and standard setting.
Now let's start with registration. Under Sarbanes-Oxley and the
Board's rules, any accounting firm that audits a company whose
securities trade in U.S. markets or plays a substantial role in those audits
must be registered with the PCAOB to continue doing that work.'
7
Registration requires the firms to provide the Board with a
prodigious amount of information about the people who work for the
firms and about the companies they audit. We did our best to make the
requests for information comprehensive but not overly burdensome.
Because we are modem people, all of the registration has been done on-
line, no paper.
As of this week, 711 firms have applied to register with the Board,
and thus far we have approved the applications of 648 public accounting
firms.
17. Id. at § 102.
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As I mentioned, registration is a prerequisite for accounting firms to
continue their work as auditors of public companies. Registration is also
the foundation, established in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, for the PCAOB
to perform its important functions of inspection and enforcement.
The Board recently approved our rules for investigations and
hearings. The Board has also approved our inspection rules and those
awaiting SEC approval.
In the meantime, we commenced limited inspection procedures at
the Big Four firms with an experienced team of auditors. Now, you may
think-we've got 845 firms, and you start with four. Well, if you're
thinking of market share, if you look at the market capitalization of the
Fortune 500 companies, the large four accounting firms have a 99
percent market share.' 8 So if we save their souls, we are probably pretty
well on the way to a better, more wonderful world.
Soon we will launch the regular inspections called for in the Act.' 9
Regular inspections will occur every year for firms with more than 100
audit clients. All other firms will be inspected once every three years.
The number that will have the joy of seeing us annually is eight, the Big
Four and then the next, quite a lot smaller, four.
Also, when the Board thinks circumstances warrant, we can order a
special inspection regardless of timing.
To facilitate inspections of more than 200 firms per year we have
opened a regional office in New York- Esslie Hughes, an
accomplished banker at the Bank of New York, is in charge of it-and
we are well on our way towards opening three more regional offices:
one in the San Francisco area, one in Dallas, and one in Atlanta.
Our inspectors will be looking for the compliance required in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act-that is, compliance with the Act, the rules of the
Board and the SEC, and professional standards. Our inspectors will
look for the tone at the top of the firm: does the managing partner and
audit team leader understand what is demanded of the accounting firm in
this new era of regulation and oversight? Do they understand the
standards for audits? And, just as important, do they understand why
18. General Accounting Office, GAO-03-864, Public Accounting Firms: Mandated
Study on Consolidation and Competition 1-2 (July 30, 2003) [hereinafter GAO Report]
(stating that the "Big 4" accounting firms "currently audit over 78% of all U.S. public
companies and 99% of public company annual sales").
19. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 104.
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those standards are in place? Do the managers lead by example,
demonstrating every day the value of those standards?
The Board and our inspectors want to know if the message of doing
the right thing is reaching the rank and file in the firms. Obviously, the
people at the top of the firm are going to say the right thing-what
choice do they have? The important thing is are they getting the
message down to the people on the firing line who actually do the work?
So our inspectors will talk to the managers. They will also talk to the
least-experienced members of the audit teams to find out if that message
is reaching them. We will look at how often and how well the message
is delivered.
We will look at compensation and promotion. Are the best auditors
rewarded for being the best auditors, or are they rewarded for something
else, like bringing in outside business? We will look at how clients are
selected and how they are let go.
Obviously, our inspectors will look at individual audits as well. We
will identify and examine the audits that carry the most risk, and we will
sample what should be simpler, more routine audits.
Finally, I want to describe the changes ahead in audit standards.
The Act charged the Board with establishing auditing and related
attestation standards, quality control standards, ethical standards, and
independent standards. Even to the eyes of a former bank regulator
those are a lot of standards to be set.
Perhaps in recognition of the magnitude of the charge, the Act gave
the Board the power to designate or recognize any professional group of
accountants to propose new standards. However, before I arrived in
June, my fellow Board members determined not to exercise the authority
to delegate, but instead voted to set the standards from within the
PCAOB. It was a decision I heartily endorse and clearly was consistent
with the intent of Congress. As all of you know, in understanding any
act of Congress you have to go look at the legislative history and find
out what they really wanted in addition to what they wound up putting
on paper. As sometimes happen, we had that option, but we shouldn't
have used it, and we didn't.
As we go about our work, the Board is fortunate to have the
expertise of Chief Auditor Doug Carmichael and his Deputy, Tom Ray.
They have assembled an excellent team, and they and the Board will be
drawing on the expertise of a standing advisory group, which is in the
process of being formed. We are now accepting nominations to that
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group, and we have posted the information on our Web site. I hope
some of you will consider service as an advisor on auditing standards.
The first standards to come from the Board are those prescribed in
the Act relating to auditors' attestation to management's assessment of
internal controls.20 It sounds like something a lawyer would create,
doesn't it? In other words, do they have internal controls over financial
accounting, and do they work?
We proposed those standards in early October and received
comments through November 6th. These proposed standards are
important because they require new oversight of the corporations and
carry direct consequences for audit committees.
In those proposed standards, the Board suggested that auditors
should make note of the effectiveness of the corporation's audit
committee, including whether the committee is independent of
management.2' Some commentators have suggested that such a
requirement places auditors and audit committees in an untenable
conflict: because an audit committee must approve the outside auditor,
does the auditor really plan to go and say the audit committee which
picked him is incompetent? I had to think about that myself, as you can
tell by the way I just expressed it.
But I have come to believe that our proposed standards would
empower both auditors and audit committees. Think of it: why would
an audit committee be ineffective? Because the management wants a
ineffective audit committee, and hopefully not a very good audit firm,
because if you are planning to do a little graceful, creative cooking of
the books you don't want the cops to be very vigilant. By empowering
the auditor and the audit committee, we make them both lean on the
management and say "this has to be taken seriously." So if you are a
director or sitting on an audit committee, you should welcome an
assessment, I think, by the auditor you hired, and the auditor should feel
comfortable giving a report card on the directors in charge of the
appointment.
20. Id. § 404.
21. PCAOB, Briefing Paper, Proposed Auditing Standards: An Audit of Internal
Control over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of Financial
Statements 9 (Oct. 7, 2003), at http://www.pcaobus.org/rules/2003-10-
07_ProposalBrief-ProposedAuditingStandard.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2004).
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As for other audit standards, the Board adopted certain existing
standards on an interim basis. Those are in place and enforceable as
Board rules while we conduct an exhaustive review of what is on the
books now and set our priorities for creating new standards.
Standard setting alone is a big job for a brand-new organization. As
a functioning entity, the PCAOB will reach a first birthday in about two
months. Add to the standard setting the unprecedented registration of
public accounting firms, as well as inspections and enforcement, and
you can see why I am intensely proud of the staff at the PCAOB.
You may be wondering why, after I had announced my plans to
retire from the Federal Reserve, I could be persuaded to take on the
chairmanship of a fledgling organization with such a huge amount of
work ahead of it. I was amenable for a lot of reasons, not the least of
which was eleven years of Jesuit education on top of eight years of
Dominican nuns, which makes me incapable of refusing public service.
But I took the job because of the opportunity to make a difference,
to do my part to help restore some of the confidence that people lost in
our markets and our public companies. The PCAOB is going to require
more work than I might have intended to do at this stage of my life. The
opportunity was undeniable.
In the wake of Enron and Arthur Andersen, the participants in our
public markets were weighed and found wanting, but they were also
given a shot at redemption. As Chairman of the PCAOB, my job is to
point accounting firms towards redemption and help them take the steps
to get there if they aren't inclined to seek redemption on their own.
What is at stake for all of us is the trust of the American people in
our markets and the companies that drive our economy. We have an
opportunity to reclaim that trust, and I for one am delighted to grab that
opportunity, and I hope very influential people like all of you, especially
including the students, will join me.
Thank you very much.
I have been allowed by Jill to actually field questions myself.
Going back to my life as a central banker, there is no such thing as an
indiscreet question. Answers can be quite indiscreet.
Would anybody like to ask the first question so that I don't have to
start asking you questions?
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QUESTION: How do you feel about lawyers providing non-lawyer
services, as the accounting firms have done so in the past, and that led to
some conflicts?
MR. McDONOUGH: I guess I know more about accountants
providing non-accounting services, like legal services, than I do about
lawyers providing non-legal services, largely because I have spent so
much time with lawyers in my life that I think they are geniuses and
experts on everything, so how could they not? I really can't give a
serious answer, so let me shift to the accountant side of it.
My job is a little frustrating because the area of responsibility that
we have in dealing with an accounting firm is partial, not total. We have
responsibility only for the work that they do on audits of public
companies. They do all kinds of work, including legal work in some
firms, for companies for which they do not do an audit, and nobody
controls that unless it is against the law.
Now, I heard, as some of you did here, Senator Carl Levin of
Michigan give a rather fiery speech yesterday at the Crime Commission
in midtown. What he is talking about, with very good reason, is tax
avoidance shelters. My view on that is that if an accounting firm is
attempting to regain public confidence, how can it be giving advice to
anybody that is so close to the edge of the law, and frequently over the
edge of the law, that it is going to bring discredit on the firm? I think
that is a very dumb thing to do, because I think we are in a position in
which they have to restore confidence in them by the American people.
Anybody else?
QUESTION: Could you comment on the reasons behind the choice
of a nonprofit organization as a forum, and how might that influence the
international cooperation that was mentioned in a recent [inaudible]
paper?
MR. McDONOUGH: We were created as a not-for-profit
corporation largely so the PCAOB could pay better than government. I
think the history of the Act is that the PCAOB part of it began in the
Senate with the then-Chairman Paul Sarbanes of Maryland, Christopher
Dodd of Connecticut, and John Corzine of New Jersey being very
actively involved. They realized that they were piling an immense
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responsibility on a startup, and so one of the things they figured out is
you're going to have to pay people better than the government can pay
people.
So we are competitive with a big accounting firm, and we pay about
twice as much as the U.S. Government can pay for a similar position.
That is why we are a not-for-profit.
It didn't give us any trouble at all in our recent discussions on the
international aspect-and thank you for letting me get into that.
When I arrived on the scene in June, there was an absolute
exchange of heavy intercontinental missiles going back and forth across
the Atlantic. People on this side were saying, "We will not negotiate
anything"; and people on the other side were saying, "It is
extraterritorial, and who are these Americans to come and inspect our
accounting firms?" I inherited that.
Well, formerly I was Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, and I dealt with exactly the same people in Europe, Japan,
and Canada and every place else. So I decided, "Piaci, piaci, peace
shall be made," and took myself over to Brussels to the European
Commission and said, "Look, all this extraterritorial stuff really doesn't
make a whole lot of sense. We all have a problem in that the world
economy is a single geopolitical, geo-economic entity. Laws are those
of the nation state, and the two will never work perfectly together. What
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is trying to do is to protect American investors
from phony financial statements. Well, a lot of people who invest in
securities in the United States are not Americans. A lot of Americans
invest in securities issued in other countries. Once you think back, you
think aren't we both trying to protect investors?"
"Right."
"Well then, why don't we do it together."
We contacted the European Commission deliberately because you
have the efficiency of dealing with fifteen countries at the same time.
Also, I knew the people there. We have worked out an arrangement by
which they will help us, and we will help them. We are in the position
now that the entire confrontation has been removed.
How will it work? If, for example, we have to go and inspect an
accounting firm in Paris, I am the only fluent French speaker at the
PCAOB. I don't want to go do the inspection. If I send fifteen people
who speak wonderful English but no French, they will get some great
meals, but they won't accomplish anything. So wouldn't it be a lot
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better if we had a deal with the French overseers, who are very good, by
the way; and they are about to pass a statute2 2 which would make them
essentially identical to our structure, so independent of the profession
financially and organizationally. So we will ask the French inspectors to
do it for us.
If they have a reason to inspect an accounting firm in the United
States that audits a French company, we will do it for them. Everybody
has decided this is one great idea and that it can work out very well.
Now obviously, if you have an issuer of securities in a place where
the rule of law is not all that it might be, then we will have to be much
more penetrating. But the alternative of the people in that country is that
we will just de-list the securities. That is pretty serious stuff.
So it is working out very well.
Sir?
QUESTION: I'm just wondering. You alluded to the oligopoly
essentially that exists with respect to auditing, at least for the Fortune
500 companies, and probably extends below the Fortune 500. Is that
harmful to your efforts to regulate the industry? I mean, should steps be
taken, in your opinion anyway, to change that?
MR. McDONOUGH: It is a marvelous question. The answer is we
don't know what to do about it.
The General Accounting Office did a very, very good report on the
concentration in the accounting profession.23 It came to the conclusion
that the first thing you think of is that four are too few, so let's create
some big ones by putting together good regional firms, and then you say,
"Okay."
They are not there. If you put the next five firms together, they
would be about half the size of number four. So you don't accomplish
very much that way. You think it might happen over time, but over time
is going to be quite a long time.
Then the next logical idea that comes to your mind is, "Let's break
up the Big Four and make eight." But when you get into exactly how
22. Financial Security Act, passed August 1, 2003 (statute no. 2003-706 of I
August 2003).
23. See GAO Report, supra note 18.
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you would do it and whether you would have eight damaged animals
instead of four healthy oligopolies, you come to the conclusion that that
isn't a very good idea either.
So I think we live in the real world of four, which is why you have
to really lean on them to get their act together. To put it in religious
terms, as I did in my prepared remarks, what I have told the people in
the Congress and then the people in the firms is, "I don't have enough
cops to have you rise to a new level of morality and culture unless you
want to do it yourselves."
Now, they are making all the right noises about wanting to do it
themselves. And why shouldn't they? Who benefits more from their
restoring their reputations than they do? And I understand that.
They don't like the fact that-you know, ten years ago if you made
a joke about accountants, it was that they're boring. Now they may still
be boring, but they also have been helping companies cook the books.
Well, that's not so good, and they are feeling kind of ashamed of
themselves, even the ones who say, "I never did that, but the guy down
in the next office might have." So I am quite convinced that they want
to change.
Now, we represent the public interest, so if there is a flagging of
enthusiasm on their part, we take a little torch and get them going again.
But what I told the Congress and told them is, "We do not have to prove
that the PCAOB is tough, or that its Chairman is a tough guy, by
hanging people in public in order to prove how macho we are." That
would be a very dumb thing to do. It's tempting, but it's not very smart.
So we want to be, I would say, a just but firm representative of the
public interest and not Savonarola burning people at the stake to
illuminate the square of the lovely city of Florence.
One last question. Professor Gardner?
QUESTION: Do you feel that the abuse of stock options is a major
explanation for the excesses of the 1990s, and what changes in
accounting rules would you recommend?
MR. McDONOUGH: Many people would attribute the importance
of stock options in the 1990s as the law of unintended consequences
from a very well-meaning piece of legislation that said that a company
could not expense the salary of any individual at more than $1 million
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unless it was performance-related. 24 Stock options are performance-
related, and so the stock option industry came in.
Then the executive compensation advisers came in. Let me tell you
how that works. I'm a wonderful, brilliant CEO. I hire you as my
consultant on compensation. The first thing you say to me is, "Bill,
you're really a genius." Well, how does this person know I'm a genius?
We just met. He knows I'm a genius because I hired him or her. So by
definition I'm a genius, and I have great judgment.
Then he decides: "Okay, here's a peer group, which just happens to
be a group that is very well paid, and since you're just so damn smart,
you've got to make in the top 25 percent of the peer group." That, I
think, was more insidious than the instrument of the stock option.
I think it's highly likely, because they have already said they are
going to do it, that the Financial Accounting Standards Board will say
that stock options should be expensed. Now, that doesn't happen until
and if the SEC approves it.
A difficulty with that is that it is very difficult to figure out how you
value options. The famous Black-Scholes model is kind of the best we
have, but you can shoot holes through it fairly easily. If you work for
me and I say, "Dick, I'm giving you a bunch of stock options, but when
you exercise them, if you sell one, you're a dead man and out of here,"
that means that that stock option is worth much, much less than if I
hadn't told you that. And nobody is altogether sure how you value that.
So I think we will be expensing stock options. There will probably
be agreed-on formulae to do it. I don't think it in and of itself will
accomplish very much, because a lot of firms are doing what Microsoft
announced: instead of stock options, they are going to give stock grants,
which are immediately expensed. Therefore they are a little bit cleaner
in that respect.
But I think what we really have to get to is a view of how much are
people really worth? The reason that I harp on this issue and why I talk
so much about the anger of the American people is that I think that what
we're really in danger of these scandals continuing.
The mutual fund scandal is one big mess. If there is anything that
would have made most Americans angry, that is it-more than Enron,
more than WorldCom. If you're being screwed on your mutual fund,
that doesn't make you feel too good.
24. 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (2003).
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Now, if this persists, the deal that made the United States of
America work is at risk. The deal is that you could be born in a very
poor family, but you had a chance to be president of the United States,
you had a chance to be the head of U.S. Steel, you could be the dean of
the Fordham Law School-anything was open to you. The number of
people who in surveys say they are sure they are going to be millionaires
is way above the number that are ever going to be millionaires, but it
proves that people think it is there.
If people begin to think that the top of the heap is filled with people
who are crooked and have their own little club, and admission will be
either difficult or you've got to be crooked too-or in a university which
is supposed to train people to be straight, to be honest-well, then the
American dream goes away.
What would be the practical effects of that? Well, the American
dream doesn't exist in most of the countries very much like us in
continental Europe. So government is much bigger, the private system
doesn't work as well, and the system that I think has worked pretty well
for us could be in danger.
That is what makes me think that the leaders of the private sector-
and, unfortunately, there is not a great deal of evidence that they are
doing it-are simply going to have to understand that they have to look
as if they have a new view of ethics and morality in order to win back
the confidence of the American people.
And this I think is not a pipe dream. I think that the belief of the
American people in the system is at risk, and that's why people like us
have to' do something about it.
Thank you very much for your attention.
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1956-1961. Mr. McDonough earned a master's degree in economics
from Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., in 1962, and a
bachelor's degree in economics from Holy Cross College in Worcester,
Massachusetts, in 1956.
Auditing standards and auditor independence are certainly a focus
of public attention today. Many have blamed gatekeepers such as
auditors for failing to detect and prevent the widespread corporate
misconduct of the past several years. Whether or not auditors can
properly be blamed for those frauds, improving the independence and
quality of the auditing process is clearly a key element in restoring
public trust in the national securities markets. Mr. McDonough and his
colleagues on the PCAOB certainly have their work cut out for them.
It is my pleasure to introduce William J. McDonough.
LECTURE
MR. McDONOUGH: Thank you.
I feel very much at home here. You can tell when you're in a Jesuit
University when the sign of the University includes Latin. I received an
honorary doctorate degree a couple of years ago from Holy Cross, and
of course the whole thing is in Latin. I think that I have met three
people who have looked at it and actually understand what it says.
I am particularly happy to be here today, but I am proud and
humbled to be delivering a lecture honoring A.A. Sommer, Jr. I did not,
in fact, have the good fortune to know Commissioner Sommer before he
passed away last year, but I have learned enough about him to know that
both investors and those of us charged with overseeing participants in
our markets lost a great friend. The abuses that we have seen in our
markets make the loss of a single voice of integrity all the more painful.
Few of us could have imagined three years ago that we would be
where we are today, in a world in which accounting, auditing, and
corporate governance would be subject to a strict new regime under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.5 Remember, just three years ago Enron was held
up as a paragon of corporate success, modem and cutting edge, from its
management structure to its grip on the world of energy contracts.
Now, you in this room need little reminder, but I think it behooves
all of us to remember from whence we have come. The American
5. Id.
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